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Abstract
We compared the relation between educational performance scores in the Programme for 
International Student Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and Science 
Study (TIMSS) on the one hand, and religiosity, as measured with the World Values Survey and the 
European Social Survey, on the other hand. We found that higher levels of religiosity (at national 
level) were associated with lower educational performance in science and mathematics (rs ranging 
from -.65 to -.74). One of the unique contributions of our data set is the ability to examine these 
trends by sex. Interestingly, even though women reported considerably higher levels of religiosity 
than men, this gap was not related to sex differences in educational performance. This latter finding 
constrains conclusions about the possible causal pathways between education, religiosity, and 
intelligence. Further, the mediating role of human development and time spent on religious 
education appear to account for the relation between education and religiosity. One possibility is 
that the relation between education and religiosity at the national level is related to overall levels of 
economic and human development, including investment in secular education.
1. Introduction
Psychologists have investigated the relation between religion and intellectual abilities for at least a 
century, beginning with Leuba’s (1916) studies of belief in a personal God and belief in 
immortality. Zuckerman, Silberman, and Hall’s (2013) recent meta-analysis revealed a reliable 
negative relation between religiosity and intelligence (r ranged between -.20 to -.25). Webster and 
Duffy (2016) reanalyzed these same data and concluded this link “is weaker and less generalizable 
than believed” (Webster & Duffy, 2016, p. 25) due to correlated variables, such as life-quality. 
Despite these arguments there is general agreement that the negative relation between religious 
beliefs and intelligence holds true, but that more precise estimates of the strength of the relation 
would require a better understanding of related variables. Here we investigated the role of several 
such variables.
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1.1 Variables related to the link between religiosity and IQ
There appear to be a number of variables related to religious beliefs and intelligence, including sex, 
education, and overall quality of life (Webster & Duffy, 2016). Level of education has been 
proposed as a mediating variable by a number of researchers (Webster & Duffy, 2016; Meisenberg 
et al., 2012; Hoge, 1974; Reeve & Basalik, 2011). As shown in Figure 1 (A), Reeve and Basalik 
(2011), for instance, suggested that individuals with higher IQs might benefit more from higher 
levels of education, which strengthen rational thinking and enable individuals to develop ways to 
understand the world without reference to supernatural forces. Meisenberg et al. found that the 
relation between education and religiosity is moderated by national levels of intelligence, with the 
relation being positive in lower-performing countries and generally negative in higher performing 
ones. 
Caption Figure 1: Schematic depiction of various models of relations between mediating 
variables. See text for details.
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It should also be noted that school education can influence performance on measures of intelligence
(Ceci, 1991; Cliffordson & Gustafsson, 2008; Lund & Thrane, 1983; Stelzl et al., 1995), whether or 
not it influences the underlying fluid intelligence (Ritchie, Bates, & Deary, 2015). National IQs 
predict national educational performance as measured in the Programme of International Student 
Assessment (PISA) (Lynn & Mikk, 2009), and in the Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS) (Lynn & Mikk, 2007). Within-country measures of intelligence and 
education correlate strongly as well (Deary et al., 2007). Indeed, intelligence and school 
performance are closely related concepts. In the current paper, we primarily focus on the relation 
between national levels of educational performance and religiosity.
1.2 Hypotheses
Given the previously observed link between intelligence and religiosity, we predict that there is a 
link between national levels of religiosity and educational performance. We hypothesize, however, 
that this is not only because of the generally negative but nuanced relation between intelligence and 
religiosity (Meisenberg et al., 2012). Instead, we suggest that the influence of religion on 
educational policies might be a factor as well. For example and as represented in Figure 1 (B), due 
to the incompatibility between evolution and traditional religious beliefs about the origin of our 
species, some teachers may be biased in their presentation of the theory of evolution (Athanasiou, 
Katakos, & Papadopoulou, 2012) or not even support the teaching of evolution at all (Abrie, 2010). 
Further, in the more general biological domain, the study of abiogenesis (origin of life) and 
reproduction may conflict with religious beliefs and views on morality. In geoscience, tectonic plate
movement may be incompatible with the biblical or quranic accounts of creation, and disbelief 
about radiometric dating may affect the interpretation of many scientific findings, including those in
archaeology and paleontology. In short, a negative effect of religion on teachers and educational 
policy makers may influence the breadth and strength of educational systems (e.g., conservatively 
religious school boards may limit the teaching of evolutionary theory, not only in Western countries;
Edis, 2009). We call this the "watering down" hypothesis; that is, an indirect effect of religion on 
the quality of educational outcomes, especially in science.
Apart from the conflict between religious texts and science education, we argue that there is another
reason for assuming that religion affects educational policies and outcomes: Investment in learning 
religious doctrine might have the opportunity cost of less time for secular education (Figure 1, C). 
We are not aware of systematic reviews on the relation between levels of religiosity and the effort 
and time spent on religious teaching (by parents and/or schools). In the context of this lack of 
empirical data, we propose that religiosity requires time and effort because religious beliefs are 
based on cultural narratives and rituals which have to be attended to, practised, memorized, and 
accepted. 
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In other words, it is not necessarily the content of the religious beliefs that might influence 
educational growth (or lack thereof), but that investment of intellectual abilities that support 
educational development are displaced by other (religious) activities (displacement hypothesis). 
This follows from Cattell’s (1987) investment theory, with investment shifting from secular 
education to religious materials rather than shifts from one secular domain (e.g., mathematics) to 
another (e.g., literature). This hypothesis might help to explain part of the variation in educational 
performance broadly (i.e., across academic domains), not just in science literacy.
1.3 Using sex differences to understand the link between religion and intelligence
Previous research has reported that women are more religious than men (for a concise review see 
Miller & Hoffmann, 1995). This is a reliable sex difference, yet seems not to have received as much
attention in psychology as other reliable sex differences.
We do not seek to explain why women are more religious, which is a complex question in and of 
itself. Proposed explanations range from those related to personality traits (e.g., women are less 
likely to risk supernatural punishment or miss out on heavenly rewards; Miller & Hoffmann, 1995; 
Collett & Lizardo, 2009) to sociological (e.g., women might be forced to act religiously through 
social, economic, or political oppression; for a review of this and other hypothesized sociological 
factors see Walter & Davie, 1998), although sociological models have been challenged (Miller & 
Stark, 2002).
If women invest more in religion than do men, then we would predict that sex differences in 
educational performance should relate to sex differences in religiosity (Figure 1, D). This could 
manifest because of individual-level displacement (larger in girls than boys) of intellectual capital 
from secular education to religious learning or if religious beliefs directly conflict with secular 
education, as noted above. In the latter case, the relation should emerge more strongly for some 
aspects of science than mathematics, but unfortunately we do not have item level performance (e.g.,
items related to evolution vs. the Krebs cycle) on the science measures to directly assess this. On 
the other hand, if religiosity in nations affects the school system as a whole (e.g., because of 
conflicts between religion and the curriculum, or because of time needed to teach religious beliefs), 
we would predict that the gender gaps in religiosity are less likely related to those in educational 
performance. And, that national levels of religiosity would be negatively related to national 
achievement levels, in keeping with the watering down hypothesis. 
It is also possible that any relation between religiosity and educational achievement is related to 
factors that affect both of them. General human and economic development, perhaps influenced by 
national levels of intelligence and dynamic relations with secular education and human capital 
development, is one possibility (Meisenberg et al., 2012). Accordingly, we also included the Human
Development Index (below) as a potential mediator of the relation between national levels of 
religiosity and national achievement levels (Figure 1, E). 
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1.4 Methodological approach
For our analyses, we used data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). The reason for combining the
data from these two sets is because of (the possible problem of) range restriction in the available 
data sets of educational performance if we used only one of them. For example, wealthier countries 
are more likely to participate in international educational surveys but most of them are at the lower 
end of the religiosity spectrum, while poorer highly religious countries may be less likely to 
participate. While PISA focuses on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and partners, TIMSS covers a somewhat broader range of countries, including 
constitutional theocracies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia (Hirschl, 2010). Otherwise, PISA and 
TIMSS are comparable in terms of studied subjects (both contain Science and Mathematics test 
results), underlying methodology (e.g., representative sampling and a Rasch model), and included 
age groups (PISA studies 15 year olds whereas TIMSS includes both 9 and 14 year olds -- we did 
not include the 9 year olds in our analyses).
Another challenge is that these large educational data sets contain no information about religious 
beliefs or religious affiliations. To deal with this, we studied the link between religiosity and 
education on a national level (and not individual student level), using separate databases, namely 
the World Values Survey and the European Social Survey (see Methods for details). Because each of
these surveys are carried out every so many years (i.e., PISA every 3 years, TIMSS every 4 years, 
World Values Survey covers a period of 5 years, and the European Social Survey every 2 years), we
analyzed three different periods, namely 2000-2004, 2005-2009, and 2010-2015. We believe that 
this helps to show the consistency of the relation between educational performance and religiosity.
Further we have taken a number of related variables into account, such as general measures of 
economic and social development and time spent on religion in school. For the latter variable, the 
data set is unfortunately so limited that we had to combine available data points from period from 
2000-2015.
In summary, in this study we address the following main questions: 1) Is there a negative link 
between national levels of educational performance and national levels of religiosity? 2) Are sex 
differences in educational performance related to sex differences in religiosity? 3) Can societal 
development and time spent on religion explain the link between educational performance and 
religiosity?
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2. Methods
In our analyses, we used the World Values Survey (Esmer & Pettersson, 2007) and the European 
Social Survey (Davidov, Schmidt & Schwartz, 2008) for information about religious attitudes, and 
data from PISA (OECD, 2003) and TIMSS (Mullis et al., 2009) for information about educational 
performance (Mathematics and Science literacy). As general measures of economic and social 
development and opportunity, we used the Human Development Index (HDI) as published in the 
Human Development Trends report. In short, the HDI is considered a "measure of progress", and is 
calculated as a score between 0 and 1 based on data around income, health, and years of schooling 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2014, p.33). We list included countries in Appendix A.
In our analyses, we distinguish between three different periods, namely 2000-2004, 2005-2009, and 
2010-2015 (Table 1) that correspond to waves 4, 5, and 6 of the World Values Survey. For each time
period, we combined the data from the World Values Survey with the data from the European Social
Survey (we used the data from all rounds, which were carried out bi-annually between 2002 and 
2014).
Period 1: 2000-2004 Period 2: 2005-2009 Period 3: 2010-2015
World Values Survey Round 4 Round 5 Round 6
European Social Survey 2002, 2004 2006, 2008 2010, 2012, 2014
PISA 2000, 2003 2006, 2009 2012, 2015
TIMSS 2003 2007 2011
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Caption Table 1: Overview of the datasets used for measures of educational performance 
and religiosity. See Appendix A for a list of country names.
We combined the question from the World Values Survey “How important is religion?” (on a 4 point
Likert scale) with the European Social Survey question “How religious are you?” (on an 11 point 
Likert scale). We mapped the 4-point scale onto the 11-point scale of the ESS and then calculated 
the national averages with this one scale for each country. Arguably, these two questions measure 
the same concept of the importance of religion, and indeed they are highly correlated across 
countries for which both measures are available. For period 1, there were only 3 countries in both 
datasets; period 2, rs=.71, n=18, p<.01; period 3, rs=.82, n=10, p<.001. In the remainder of this 
article, we will refer to this concept as “religiosity”.
For educational achievement in mathematics and science, we used the data from TIMSS 
(assessments in 2003, 2007, and 2011) and PISA (assessments in 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, and
2015). One of the relevant differences for this study is that the age of students in PISA are on 
average 15 years and in TIMSS 14-years (we did not include the 4th grade data of TIMSS), and that 
PISA and TIMSS include different sets of countries (37% of countries participated in both). We 
combined the z-scores of the national averages of TIMSS and PISA scores. By including both 
measures, we substantially increased the number of countries available for our analyses.
For time spent on religious education, we took data from the Education at a Glance (OECD, 2002) 
reports covering the period 2000 to 2014. Compared to the PISA and TIMSS data sets, available 
data in regard to time spent on religious education (measured as a percentage of total compulsory 
instruction time) in secondary education are limited to a relatively small number of countries (when 
we combine the data from 2000 to 2014, we have these data only for 32 countries in our educational
datasets). Therefore, we collated the data of the whole period 2000-2014 instead of dividing data up
into three separate periods.
We used data from the World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015) for color coding in 
figures by majority religion (majority Christian, majority Muslim, or otherwise). We counted a 
country as Christian if the majority of the population counted as Christian irrespective of 
denomination (e.g., catholic, protestant). It should be noted that this was not further considered in 
our analyses, but merely used for illustrative purposes. This because there can, for obvious reasons, 
be a large difference between actual religiosity (our main variable of interest) and religious 
classification. Note that Israel, Japan, and Thailand each have a majority religion (Judaism, 
Shintoism, and Buddhism, respectively) but are colored black in Figures 2 and 3.
In our statistical analyses, we used either Pearson (r) or Spearman (rs) correlation depending on 
whether (r) or not (rs) the samples were not distinguishable from a normal distribution (Shapiro-
Wilk test at p>.05, Shapiro & Wilk, 1965).
7
3. Results
For each of the three periods, we found that higher levels of religiosity were associated with lower 
levels of science performance (Fig 2, top panels). A similar relation was found between religiosity 
and performance in mathematics (Fig. 2, bottom panels).
Caption Figure 2: Relation between religiosity (x-axes) and school children's performance in
science (y-axes top) and mathematics (y-axes bottom). For each panel, we indicated the 
Spearman correlation (*** indicates p<.001). See methods for details on color coding.
The same pattern emerges for science and mathematics, because of the very strong correlation 
between these two variables (2000-2004: rs=.95, n=79, 2005-2009: rs=.97, n=55, 2010-2015: rs=.97,
n=62); the correlations between religiosity and science literacy did not differ from the correlations 
between religiosity and mathematics (William's tests, ps>.41).
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Next, we report the relation between sex and religiosity, and how this might play into the relation 
between religiosity and academic performance. For the same countries for which we have 
TIMSS/PISA results, we found that for period 1 (n=47), women reported higher religiosity in 85% 
of countries (for cases in which we have more than one data point, for example data from both 
WVS and ESS, if at least in one of those was statistically significant at p<.05).  In period 2 (n=55), 
the percentage was the same (85%). In period 3 (n=60), however, this dropped to 40%.  The drop in 
period 3 could be due to the use of a different set of countries. Indeed, if we apply the above 
analyses to the countries with data for each of the 3 periods (n=24), the percentages are 92%, 92%, 
and 83%. Note that we found no countries where men reported a higher level of religiosity than 
women, as found by the Pew Research Center (2016).
Of interest is that countries with higher overall levels of religiosity have smaller sex differences in 
religiosity (for all periods, for 2010-2014, rs=.56, n=82, p<.001). This is, however, likely a ceiling 
effect.
Relevant to hypotheses about the within-country correlation between educational abilities and 
religiosity are our analyses of the sex differences in religiosity and the sex differences in 
mathematics or science performance. For each of the three periods, we found no relation between 
these variables (Fig. 3).
Caption Figure 3: Relation between sex differences in religiosity (x-axes) and sex 
differences in Science (top panels) and Mathematics (bottom panels). Note that negative 
values indicate higher scores for women. See methods for details about color coding. As 
noted (text), women were more religious, with nearly all points left of zero, with a less 
consistent pattern of sex differences in science and mathematics. In no period was there a 
statistically significant correlation between these variables, consistent with the displacement 
hypothesis.
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We found a negative relation between the time spent on religion and science literacy, r(30)=-.40, 
p=.023, and mathematics, rs=-.44, n=32, p=.012 (Figure 4). These correlations are not statistically 
different from one another, William's test p=.42.
Caption Figure 4: Relation between time spent on religion (% of compulsory instruction 
time) and normalised science literacy (left) and mathematics (right) for the period 2000-
2015. AUS: Australia; AUT: Austria; BEL: Belgium; CAN: Canada; CHL: Chile; DEU: 
Germany; DNK: Denmark; EGY: Egypt; ENG: England; ESP: Spain; FIN: Finland; GRC: 
Greece; HUN: Hungary; IDN: Indonesia; IRL: Ireland; ISL: Iceland; ISR: Israel; ITA: Italy; 
JOR: Jordan; JPN: Japan; LTU: Lithuania; LUX: Luxembourg; MEX: Mexico; MYS: 
Malaysia; NOR: Norway; PER: Peru; POL: Poland; PRT: Portugal; SCO: Scotland; SVK: 
Slovak Republic; TUN: Tunisia; TUR: Turkey.
3.1 Mediation model
We tested if the strong link between national levels of educational performance and religiosity can 
be accounted for by mediating variables. Using partial correlation, we tested for each of the three 
periods if general human development (Table 2) could account for the link. For each period, HDI 
partially accounted for the relation between educational performance and religiosity (Table 3).
Period 1: 2000-2004 Period 2: 2005-2009 Period 3: 2010-2015
Human Development 
Index x Religiosity
-.68*** -.70*** -.72***
n 46 55 61
10
Caption Table 2: Religiosity was strongly related with HDI. *** indicates Spearman 
correlation p<.001.
Next, we tested the extent to which time spent on religious education added to this model. To do so, 
we calculated the partial correlation between religiosity and education with both the mediating 
variables HDI and time spent on religion, rs= -.21, p=.28. The reduction needs to be interpreted 
with caution, however, because it is based on only 30 countries and covariation of HDI alone 
reduces the relation to non-significance, albeit the absolute magnitude of the effect is larger before 
controlling for time (Table 3).
Period EDU*RELI EDU*RELI | HDI EDU*RELI | HDI,TIME
2000-2004 -.63*** (47) -.35* (46) --
2005-2009 -.76*** (55) -.43*** (55) --
2010-2015 -.75*** (62) -.35** (61) --
2000-2015 -.71*** (80) -.48*** (78)
-.21 (30, p=.28)
2000-2015 -.77*** (30) -.27 (30, p=.14)
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Caption Table 3: Column 2: The correlation between educational performance (EDU) in 
science literacy on the one hand and religiosity on the other hand (RELI). Column 3: The 
same correlation after accounting for human development (HDI). Column 4: The same 
correlation after accounting for both HDI and the time spent on religion in school (TIME). 
Note that far fewer data points were available for TIME. For comparability, in the last row 
(grey) we have calculated the same correlations of columns 2 and 3 with the 30 countries for
which we have data points.
4. Discussion
Our data analyses reveal a strong relation between national levels of religiosity and adolescents’  
educational performance. In three time periods between 2000 and 2015, higher national levels of 
religiosity were consistently associated with lower national levels of science and mathematics 
achievement. This is consistent with previous links between performance on intelligence measures 
and measures of religiosity, given the strong relation between intelligence and educational outcomes
(Walberg, 1984; Lynn & Mikk, 2007, 2009). Further, we found that although women scored higher 
on religiosity in the majority of countries in the first two periods, this was not related to the sex 
differences in science and mathematics. Therefore, it might be the case that women’s higher 
religiosity had no effect on the relative performance of women and men in mathematics or science 
(although we are cautious drawing conclusions based on the lack of an effect). We also found a 
negative relation between time spent on religious education during school time and educational 
performance. Finally, we found that the level of development of nations and the time spent on 
religion in school can statistically explain the link between educational performance and religiosity 
(although there are limitations, discussed below, due to low statistical power). Altogether, these 
patterns have implications for better understanding the relation between religiosity and educational 
development, as we will elaborate on below.
4.1 Implications for hypotheses
Our findings are consistent with earlier reports of a negative correlation between national 
intelligence and religiosity (Zuckerman et al., 2013), with reports showing the important role of 
mediating variables (Meisenberg et al., 2012; Webster & Duffy, 2016), and with reports that women
score higher on religiosity (reviewed in Miller & Hoffman, 1995). Note that our data analyses were 
not intended to address why women show stronger forms of religiosity than men (see Collett & 
Lizardo, 2009; Miller & Hoffman, 1995; Pew Research Center, 2016).
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If we assume that within-country variation in religiosity relates strongly to within-country variation 
in educational performance, then the sex differences in achievement and especially science literacy 
should parallel the sex differences in religiosity. This was, however, not at all the case, inconsistent 
with the watering down hypothesis. The result also has implications for models of how religiosity 
and educational performance may relate to one another. Given our findings, one possibility is that 
national levels of education and even within-country variation in educational performance are not 
directly influenced by national levels of religiosity. Instead, it is possible that religious belief 
systems influence educational policies that in turn affect the secular education of all students (i.e., 
of boys and girls equally) and across academic domains. This is in line with the displacement 
hypothesis.
Of possible importance to this is that the relation between religiosity and science literacy is as 
strong as the relation between religiosity and mathematics performance. This is of interest, given 
that mathematics is religiously neutral. One could argue that this is consistent with general 
intelligence as the best explanatory cause of the relation between educational performance and 
levels of religiosity. Equally, it might be that it is not so much the specific content of religious 
teaching (e.g., limited or alternative teaching in regard to evolutionary theory), but that it is that 
average levels of national religiosity simply affect all educational domains equally; specifically, 
intellectual capital is displaced from secular education to religious education.
We found that the strong correlations between religiosity and educational performance were 
mediated by both the level of human development and time spent on teaching religion. It could be 
that all of these relations are due to a third variable, such as general intelligence, or to more subtle 
and dynamic effects. For instance, high levels of religiosity may contribute to lower HDI (e.g., 
restricted women’s rights) and lower investment in secular education. Or, lower levels of HDI drive 
higher levels of religiosity, due to more difficult life circumstances, or some combination of effects. 
The available data do not allow us to fully explore these alternatives, given that the number of 
countries for which we had all variables was 30, thus much smaller than for the main analyses. 
Although inconclusive here, the finding that time spent on religion in school was negatively related 
to academic achievement is directly related to the displacement hypothesis and merits further study. 
4.2 Implications for further research
The strong relation between national levels of religiosity and educational performance is striking. 
Given this strong effect and given previous findings of a link between religiosity and IQ, it is 
surprising that this relation has not received more attention from educational researchers and policy 
makers. If this has merely been an oversight, we hope that our findings might change this.
13
A first step for educational researchers and policy makers would be to collect more data on this 
subject to get a better understanding of within-country relations between religiosity and educational 
performance. For example, we recommend the inclusion of measures of religiosity, religious family 
values, and religious education in PISA, TIMSS, and other educational surveys. After all, this 
variable can explain a good deal of variance in educational performance, and likely more strongly 
than many other variables that data are collected on (e.g., children's confidence or parental 
attitudes).
Related to this, we recommend that educational tests would distinguish science literacy questions 
related to religious beliefs (e.g., about evolution, carbon dating, etc) from those not related to 
religious beliefs (e.g., about gravity). This would allow us to more directly relate the effects of 
religiosity to relevant science knowledge. Right now, the science literacy score includes many 
questions unrelated to religious beliefs, and this combined with the high correlation between 
national science literacy and national mathematics scores, results in a limited opportunity to 
determine if science literacy is affected by religiosity differently than mathematics (and hence 
limited opportunity to properly test the watering down hypothesis).
4.3 Limitations
First, our data are correlational in nature, which limits conclusions about causal pathways. Second, 
we used adult surveys about religiosity and cannot be sure that the measures can be generalized to 
the age group in question (there are very few reports on the development of religiosity across the 
lifespan, but see Bengtson et al., 2015). Third, religiosity measures might suffer from a ceiling 
effect, given that sex differences in high scoring countries were smaller. Fourth, the subset of 
nations for which we have a measure on all relevant variables is small, and relevant variables are 
strongly correlated, which both complicate multivariate regression, and make use of more 
sophisticated methods, such as structural equation modelling, inappropriate. Fifth, conclusions in 
regard to the mediating role of HDI depend to some extent on the number of countries analyzed. 
Because we had limited data on time spent on religion, the conclusions on the role of HDI as a 
mediating variable vary between being a partial to a complete mediator. More detailed data will be 
able to resolve this issue in the future. 
4.4 Conclusions
National levels of religiosity are strongly related to national levels of educational performance. 
While we cannot draw firm causal conclusions, our results suggest that limited human development 
factors and more time spent on religious education may affect the quality of a country's secular 
education.
14
5. Appendices
5.1 Appendix A
List of countries for which we have educational performance and religiosity data for each of the 
three periods as well for the time spent on religion in any of the three periods. The average 
religiosity, science, mathematics, HDI scores, and time spent on religious education for the periods 
2000-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2015, as well as 2000-2015 are listed.
Religiosity Science Literacy Mathematics 
country
2000-
2004
2005-
2009
2010-
2015
2000-
2015
2000-
2004
2005-
2009
2010-
2015
2000-
2015
2000-
2004
2005-
2009
2010-
2015
2000-
2015 HDI Time
Albania 5.77 7.18 6.48 -1.87 -1.22 -1.29 -1.46 -1.41 -1.3 -1.23 -1.31 0.7
Algeria 9.67 9.6 9.64 -1.07 -2.03 -1.55 -0.99 -2.03 -1.51 0.69
Argentina 7.01 6.26 5.43 6.24 -1.49 -1.27 -1.49 -1.42 -1.31 -1.31 -1.57 -1.4 0.79
Armenia 8.08 8.08 -0.21 0.27 -0.58 -0.17 0.13 0.57 0.04 0.25 0.7
Australia 4.33 3.62 3.98 0.85 0.93 0.79 0.86 0.71 0.76 0.56 0.68 0.92 1
Austria 5.16 5.2 4.6 4.99 0.45 0.61 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.61 0.58 0.57 0.86 6.67
Bahrain 7.43 7.43 -0.53 -0.08 -0.33 -0.31 -0.89 -0.84 -0.79 -0.84 0.81
Belgium 4.87 4.85 4.51 4.74 0.44 0.71 0.57 0.57 0.77 0.89 0.77 0.81 0.88 6
Brazil 7.91 7.87 7.89 -2.1 -1.24 -1.53 -1.63 -2.3 -1.42 -1.63 -1.78 0.72
Bulgaria 4.54 4.5 4.52 -0.24 -0.38 -0.61 -0.41 -0.28 -0.45 -0.56 -0.43 0.76
Canada 5.93 5.84 5.89 0.87 1.12 1.05 1.01 0.91 1.04 0.88 0.94 0.89 1.67
Chile 7.35 6.81 5.66 6.61 -1.01 -0.45 -0.47 -0.64 -1.23 -0.79 -0.82 -0.94 0.8 5.1
Colombia 8 8 -1.17 -1.4 -1.29 -1.34 -1.62 -1.48 0.69
Croatia 6.2 6.16 6.18 0.38 0.16 0.27 0 -0.05 -0.02 0.79
Cyprus 7.05 7.22 7.14 -0.49 -0.34 -0.42 -0.12 0.1 -0.01 0.83
Czech Republic 2.85 2.27 2.17 2.43 0.75 0.83 0.51 0.7 0.48 0.63 0.49 0.53 0.85
Denmark 4.33 4.21 4.07 4.2 -0.1 0.52 0.51 0.31 0.59 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.9 3
Egypt 9.9 9.82 9.79 9.84 -0.77 -1.07 -0.92 -0.83 -0.94 -0.88 0.66 5
England 0.94 1.16 0.95 1.02 0.4 0.77 0.62 0.6 4.15
Estonia 3.47 3.67 3.46 3.53 1.05 1.08 1.28 1.14 0.83 0.82 0.94 0.86 0.83
Finland 5.47 5.15 4.99 5.2 1.3 1.6 1.28 1.39 1.04 1.33 0.8 1.06 0.87 4.33
France 3.77 3.81 4.17 3.92 0.51 0.5 0.44 0.48 0.58 0.53 0.45 0.52 0.87
Georgia 9.19 9.36 9.28 -1.19 -1.06 -1.13 -0.97 -0.82 -0.9 0.73
Germany 4.25 4.06 4.33 4.21 0.28 0.88 0.84 0.66 0.29 0.73 0.75 0.59 0.89 5.07
Ghana 9.59 9.64 9.61 -3.08 -2.83 -2.66 -2.86 -2.55 -2.07 -1.92 -2.18 0.53
Greece 7.47 6.3 6.18 6.65 -0.22 0.06 -0.31 -0.16 -0.59 -0.02 -0.31 -0.31 0.85 6
Hong Kong 4.17 4.14 4.15 1.15 1.23 1.19 1.19 1.39 1.49 1.64 1.51 0.87
Hungary 4.24 4.23 3.98 4.15 0.56 0.79 0.4 0.58 0.37 0.57 0.29 0.41 0.81 2.67
Iceland 6.06 5.27 5.66 0.27 0.44 0 0.24 0.6 0.7 0.39 0.56 0.88 2.2
Indonesia 9.93 9.77 9.85 -1.51 -1.19 -1.49 -1.4 -1.59 -1.19 -1.49 -1.42 0.65 5.88
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 9.13 9.03 9.08 -0.32 -0.22 0.02 -0.18 -0.76 -0.76 -0.7 -0.74 0.71
Ireland 5.84 5.43 4.99 5.42 0.56 0.7 0.75 0.67 0.39 0.5 0.61 0.5 0.89 8.07
Israel 4.72 4.6 4.91 4.74 -0.31 -0.19 0.13 -0.12 -0.12 -0.19 0.23 -0.03 0.87 9.08
Italy 6.14 6.75 5.91 6.27 0.07 0.29 0.3 0.22 -0.14 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.86 3.07
Japan 2.97 2.75 2.99 2.9 1.29 1.24 1.37 1.3 1.18 1.2 1.32 1.23 0.88 3
Jordan 9.83 9.79 9.76 9.79 -0.02 -0.53 -1.04 -0.53 -0.58 -1.01 -1.36 -0.98 0.74 8.33
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Kazakhstan 5.5 5.5 -1.05 -0.42 -0.74 -0.86 -0.22 -0.54 0.74
Korea 5.31 5 5.4 5.23 1.26 1.18 1.16 1.2 1.27 1.56 1.58 1.47 0.87
Latvia (LSS) 4.03 4.03 0.08 0.41 0.43 0.31 0.11 0.33 0.3 0.25 0.79
Lebanon 7.49 7.49 -1.16 -0.98 -1.44 -1.19 -0.47 -0.13 -0.76 -0.45 0.75
Lithuania 5.39 5.39 0.6 0.51 0.35 0.49 0.44 0.42 0.3 0.38 0.81 3
Luxembourg 4.15 4.15 -0.37 0.3 0.24 0.06 -0.14 0.42 0.33 0.21 0.88 6.17
Macedonia 7.29 7.29 -0.89 -1.45 -1.17 -0.92 -1.17 -1.05 0.73
Malaysia 9.17 9.37 9.27 0.47 -0.35 -0.98 -0.29 0.53 -0.33 -0.67 -0.15 0.75 9
Mexico 8.41 8 7.89 8.1 -1.49 -0.98 -1.24 -1.23 -1.61 -0.86 -1.11 -1.19 0.73 8
Moldova 6.83 6.57 6.7 -0.06 -0.84 -0.91 -0.6 -0.11 -0.98 -0.87 -0.66 0.65
Morocco 9.82 9.62 9.58 9.67 -1.11 -1.18 -1.55 -1.28 -1.09 -1.08 -1.34 -1.17 0.58
Netherlands 5.06 4.42 4.13 4.54 0.9 0.97 0.81 0.9 1.1 1.06 0.9 1.02 0.9
New Zealand 4 4.2 4.1 0.79 1.11 0.74 0.88 0.68 0.94 0.46 0.69 0.9
Norway 4.06 3.83 3.78 3.89 0.21 0.37 0.4 0.33 0.17 0.38 0.37 0.31 0.93 6.73
Palestinian 
Nat’l Auth. 9.45 9.45 -0.57 -1.14 -0.84 -0.85 -1.03 -1.27 -0.86 -1.05
Peru 7.79 7.36 7.61 7.58 -2.69 -1.58 -1.86 -2.04 -2.78 -1.5 -1.73 -2 0.71 6
Philippines 9.45 9.44 9.45 -1.38 -1.38 -1.2 -1.2 0.64
Poland 6.59 6.9 6.55 6.68 0.19 0.61 0.78 0.52 0.02 0.51 0.77 0.43 0.81 7
Portugal 5.5 5.81 5.44 5.58 -0.39 0.26 0.41 0.09 -0.33 0.2 0.37 0.08 0.8 3
Qatar 9.96 9.96 -2.08 -1.31 -1.7 -2.04 -1.26 -1.65 0.84
Romania 7.45 7.68 7.57 -0.37 -0.59 -0.58 -0.51 -0.32 -0.46 -0.35 -0.37 0.76
Russian 
Federation 4.47 4.56 4.52 0.09 0.45 0.52 0.35 0.09 0.34 0.6 0.34 0.76
Saudi Arabia 9.53 9.53 -1.1 -1.16 -0.59 -0.95 -1.81 -1.8 -1.01 -1.54 0.79
Scotland 0.49 0.4 0.44 0.39 0.41 0.4 5
Serbia 6.37 6.37 -0.67 -0.35 -0.71 -0.58 -0.41 -0.15 -0.47 -0.34 0.74
Singapore 6.65 7.13 6.89 1.41 1.46 1.69 1.52 1.82 1.77 1.95 1.84 0.86
Slovak 
Republic 5.79 5.97 5.99 5.92 0.35 0.37 -0.2 0.18 0.38 0.5 0.16 0.35 0.81 3
Slovenia 4.87 4.59 4.39 4.61 0.61 0.92 0.89 0.81 0.33 0.63 0.65 0.53 0.86
South Africa 8.58 8.57 7.87 8.34 -3.24 -2.25 -2.75 -2.71 -1.61 -2.16 0.63
Spain 4.64 4.43 4.17 4.41 0.14 0.35 0.39 0.29 0.02 0.29 0.28 0.2 0.85 3
Sweden 3.81 3.53 3.29 3.55 0.6 0.58 0.38 0.52 0.47 0.53 0.31 0.44 0.89
Switzerland 5.31 5.05 5.01 5.12 0.48 0.81 0.71 0.67 0.82 1.12 1.05 1 0.91
Thailand 8.28 8.06 8.17 -1.06 -0.54 -0.71 -0.77 -0.96 -0.58 -0.79 -0.78 0.7
Trinidad and 
Tobago 8.8 8.94 8.87 -0.89 -0.98 -0.94 -0.71 -0.92 -0.82 0.75
Tunisia 9.78 9.78 -1.72 -1.04 -1.33 -1.36 -1.59 -1.22 -1.35 -1.39 0.7 5
Turkey 8.03 7.95 8.58 8.19 -1.27 -0.45 -0.38 -0.7 -1.18 -0.45 -0.5 -0.71 0.71 5.54
Ukraine 5.22 5.26 5.3 5.26 0.22 0.44 0.33 0.06 0.22 0.14 0.72
United 
Kingdom 4.34 4.19 3.96 4.16 0.89 0.81 0.75 0.82 0.65 0.5 0.44 0.53 0.89
United States 7.8 7 6.54 7.11 0.41 0.58 0.57 0.52 0.25 0.42 0.29 0.32 0.9
Uruguay 4.77 4.3 4.53 -1.17 -0.71 -1.02 -0.97 -1.21 -0.61 -1.05 -0.96 0.77
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